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Nontechnical Summary
In economics public goods are regularly treated as pure public goods, although most
public goods are not ”purely public”. The reason for doing so most likely lies in the
simplicity of pure public goods analysis. In contrast, the analysis of public goods which
are not purely public tends to become rather complex.
Pioneering work with respect to the issue of impure public goods has been provided by
Cornes and Sandler (1984), who developed an approach to analyze impure public goods
where the considered consumer’s utility function is defined over three characteristics. They
suggested to apply this approach to an activity like philanthropy. This idea has later been
elaborated and initiated a new strand of literature which is associated with the expression
”warm-glow giving”. Many further analyses of impure public goods followed which were
based on the approach suggested by Cornes and Sandler. Results were obtained which
could not be observed by employing the simple pure public good approach. So, Cornes
and Sandler (1994) illustrated in a comparative static analysis that quite surprising results
may arise within an impure public good model. In fact, in their modelling, they analyzed
the joint production of characteristics of different degrees of publicness. Their analysis
demonstrated that substitutability and complementarity of the private and pure public
characteristics generated by the public good play a crucial role with respect to comparative
static responses. Joint characteristic or joint production models have been used to analyze,
e.g., climate protection, environmentally friendly consumption, financing of public radio
stations, military alliances, refuse collection, and terrorism. Probably almost every global
public good provision represents a joint production of several characteristics of different
degrees of publicness, i.e., global public goods production is an impure public goods
production.
Although impure public good models found application in many fields of economics,
one issue has been widely neglected until recently: the effect of alternative technologies on
the models’ results. The neglect of alternative technologies may cause an overstatement
of the benefits of a joint production technology and may therefore, result in an inefficient
level of joint production. Let us consider the example of climate policy. A climate policy
which raises energy efficiency, for example, tends to reduce the required level of fossil
fuels to be combusted. This reduction is, on the one hand, associated with a mitigation
of greenhouse gas emissions and, consequently, provides climate-protection and primary
benefits. On the other hand, the reduction is associated with ancillary effects in the shape
of, e.g., a decline in other pollutants’ emissions like sulphur dioxide emissions. Several
studies predict that the associated ancillary benefits even exceed the primary benefits.
However, regularly, it is at least implicitly postulated that the ancillary benefits can only
be acquired by climate policies. Yet, desulphurisation installations would also be an ef-
fective means to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions and these installations do not protect
the climate. A priori, it is not clear from a welfare economics’ point of view whether it
is more efficient to mitigate sulphur dioxide by means of desulphurisation installations or
by means of climate policies, since the implementation costs of the different technologies
may diverge. Provided a country would consider desulphurisation installations to be more
attractive, an augmented use of such installations would reduce the ancillary benefits of
climate policy and, therefore, would tend to reduce total benefits of climate protection.
This, again, mitigates the attractiveness of climate policy. As this example discloses,
quantities and prices/costs of the alternative technologies exclusively producing the pri-
vate characteristic, are crucial for the ancillary benefits of climate policy to be expected,
and consequently, for the efficient policy design. Changes in these parameters have an
impact on the efficient impure public good level, in our example, on the optimal climate
policy level.
In our paper we present a more general setting of the comparative statics model sug-
gested by Cornes and Sandler (1994). The integration of an alternative technology into
the comparative statics model, however, requires the analysis of three instead of two
commodities. By this extension different levels of substitutability between the jointly
provided private goods/characteristics and other private goods can be captured. Only
a certain group of private goods is considered to represent an adequate substitute for
the joint production’s private characteristic, and this group is assumed to be regulated
by a central authority. As we show, these extensions are sensible for analyzing several
real-world impure-public-goods examples. The focus of the comparative statics analysis
is on the two parameters directly associated with the substitute: its prices and quan-
tities. In order to check and refine the results of the analytical study, we employed a
simulation model for the example of climate policy in Germany. Here, climate protection
represents the global public characteristic of the impure public good ”climate policy”,
while sulphur dioxide abatement represents the private characteristic, from an individual
country’s point of view. In fact, most options to reduce the emission levels of the green-
house gas CO2 turn out to be simultaneously reducing the emissions of sulphur dioxide.
However, the emissions of sulphur dioxide can also be mitigated independently of climate
policy by means of desulphurisation installations, which represent the technology indepen-
dently generating the private characteristic of the impure public good. The results of the
simulations confirmed the findings of the analytical model. So, the increase of the price
of climate-policy independent sulphur dioxide abatement exerts a negative income effect.
Consequently, the abatement has a negative impact on impure public good provision, and
therefore on climate protection levels. As our explicit illustration of welfare effects in the
framework of the simulation model shows, welfare levels unambiguously decline with the
considered price increases. In contrast to the ambiguous results of our analytical repre-
sentation with respect to the impacts of an increase in the provision of the rationed good,
we found unambiguous effects of such an increase in our simulation model. The provision
of the impure public good decrease with increasing levels of the rationed private good.
Due to the inefficiently low provision level in the baseline scenario, the increased produc-
tion of the rationed good caused an improvement of welfare. Interestingly, the impact of
the price increase of sulphur dioxide abatement has minor effects on climate protection
levels compared to increases in the climate-policy-independent enhancement of sulphur
dioxide abatement. Consequently, it turns out to be likely that stricter regulations on
air-pollution may cause the attractiveness of climate policy to decline significantly, while
price increases of this control tend to have only minor effects.
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Abstract
Impure public goods represent an important group of goods. Almost every public
good exerts not only effects which are public to all but also effects which are private
to the producer of this good. What is often omitted in the analysis of impure
public goods is the fact that – regularly – these private effects can also be generated
independently of the public good.
In our analysis we focus on the effects alternative technologies – independently
generating the private effects of the public good – may have on the provision of
impure public goods. After the investigation in an analytical impure public good
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1 Introduction
In economics public goods are regularly treated as pure public goods, although most
public goods are not “purely public”. The reason for doing so most likely lies in the
simplicity of pure public goods analysis. In contrast, the analysis of public goods which
are not purely public tends to become rather complex.
Pioneering work with respect to the issue of impure public goods has been provided by
Cornes and Sandler (1984), who developed an approach to analyze impure public goods
where the considered consumer’s utility function is defined over three characteristics.
They suggested to apply this approach to an activity like philanthropy. This idea has
later been elaborated by Andreoni (1986, 1989, 1990). Andreoni’s works initiated a new
strand of literature which is associated with the expression “warm-glow giving”.
Many further analyses of impure public goods followed which were based on the ap-
proach suggested by Cornes and Sandler. Results were obtained which could not be ob-
served by employing the simple pure public good approach. So, Cornes and Sandler (1994)
illustrated in a comparative static analysis that quite surprising results may arise within
an impure public good model. In fact, in their modelling, they analyzed the joint produc-
tion of characteristics of different degrees of publicness. Their analysis demonstrated that
substitutability and complementarity of the private and pure public characteristics gener-
ated by the public good play a crucial role with respect to comparative static responses.
Such effects could - of course - not be observed in pure public good models, since these
models exclusively focus on the public good’s pure public characteristic and disregard
private ancillary characteristics of public goods. Ihori (1992,1994) analyses some further
comparative static properties of impure public good models, but his modelling differs from
the one suggested by Cornes and Sandler (1994).
And despite its complexity, joint production and impure public goods modelling be-
came an attractive device in the economics discipline. Joint characteristic or joint produc-
tion models have been used to analyze, e.g., climate protection (Sandler (1996), Ru¨bbelke
(2003)), environmentally friendly consumption (Kotchen (2005)), financing of public ra-
dio stations (Kingma and McClelland (1995)), military alliances (Sandler and Murdoch
(1990), Sandler and Hartley (2001)), refuse collection (Dubin and Navarro (1988)), and
terrorism (Ru¨bbelke (2005)).
Additional interest in impure public goods models may arise because of the topicality
of the global public goods discussion (Kaul et al. (1999)). Probably almost every global
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public good provision represents a joint production of several characteristics of different
degrees of publicness, i.e., global public goods production is an impure public goods
production.1
So, preservation of tropical forests may be considered as a global impure public good.
A pure public characteristic of this public good is the preservation of biodiversity which
provides genetic material that may contain cures for diseases representing dangers for all
humans. Another pure public characteristic is the global climate protecting impact of the
forests’ carbon storage. But as Sandler (1997: 97) points out: “Not all of the benefits of
the forests are global public goods; many are either private goods or public goods whose
benefits are either specific to the host nation or to neighboring nations.” Such private
benefits are derived, e.g., from reduced soil erosion and preservation of watersheds.
Reducing poverty by raising foreign aid also provides several characteristics of dif-
ferent degrees of publicness. In March 2002, US President George W. Bush announced
the first significant raise in US development assistance in a decade. This represents a 50
percent increase over current development assistance (Diamond 2002: 2). Before, the US
aid budget has fallen from 0.24 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s to 0.1 percent in 2002.
The recent sharp increase in the US foreign aid has been justified by the claim that the
reduction of poverty will combat terrorism.2 Therefore, we face a global public character-
istic which we may denote “international security”. Furthermore, the reduction of poverty
by paying transfers generates monetary benefits in the poor regions. These benefits are
mainly perceived regionally and are ‘private’ to the transfer-receiving region (the transfers
can be employed to improve national infrastructure, to construct new hospitals or schools
etc.).
The same line of reasoning can be applied to other global issues like climate protection,
international combat of diseases or protection of international waters. Examples of impure
public goods of smaller geographical dimension are, e.g., theaters or universities. Of
course, there is an audience enjoying shows in the theater. However, according to Baumol
and Bowen (1966), performing arts may also raise local identity and international prestige.
Hence, we observe a kind of private (enjoyed exclusively by the audience) as well as a
locally/regionally public (enjoyed by the whole region) characteristic. Similarly, students
1Sandler and Hartley (2001: 880) even stress: “The joint product model is relevant for virtually every
public good scenario.” And joint production is in general associated with characteristics of different
degrees of publicness.
2President Bush pointed out in his speech at the United Nations Financing for Development Conference
in Monterrey, Mexico: “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.”
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get education in universities (private characteristic), but a university also provides benefits
to its whole region by attracting companies (regionally public characteristic).
Although impure public good models found application in many fields of economics,
one issue has been widely neglected until recently: the effect of alternative technologies on
the models’ results. The neglect of alternative technologies may cause an overstatement
of the benefits of a joint production technology and may therefore result in an inefficient
level of joint production. Let us consider the example of climate policy. A climate policy
which raises energy efficiency, for example, tends to reduce the required level of fossil
fuels to be combusted. This reduction is, on the one hand, associated with a mitigation
of greenhouse gas emissions and, consequently, provides climate-protection and primary
benefits.3 On the other hand, the reduction is associated with ancillary effects in the
shape of, e.g., a decline in other pollutants’ emissions like SO2 emissions. Several studies
predict that the associated ancillary benefits even exceed the primary benefits.4 However,
regularly, it is at least implicitly postulated that the ancillary benefits can only be acquired
by climate policies. Yet, desulphurisation installations would also be an effective means
to reduce SO2 emissions and these installations do not protect the climate. A priori, it is
not clear from a welfare economics’ point of view whether it is more efficient to mitigate
SO2 by means of desulphurisation installations or by means of climate policies, since
the implementation costs of the different technologies may diverge.5 Provided a country
would consider desulphurisation installations to be more attractive, an augmented use
of such installations would reduce the ancillary benefits of climate policy and, therefore,
would tend to reduce total benefits of climate protection. This, again, mitigates the
attractiveness of climate policy.6 As this example discloses, quantities and prices/costs of
the alternative technologies exclusively producing the private characteristic, are crucial for
the ancillary benefits of climate policy to be expected, and consequently, for the efficient
policy design. Changes in these parameters have an impact on the efficient impure public
good level, in our example, on the optimal climate policy level.
One of the rare exceptions in the literature that takes account of the role of alter-
native technologies, is the joint supply model suggested by Posnett and Sandler (1986).
3Since climate protection is the primary aim of climate policy, the benefits derived from climate
protection are called the primary benefits of climate policy.
4For an overview of studies and ratios between primary and ancillary benefits, see Pearce (2000).
5Of course, if equal cost would prevail, the climate policy option is more attractive, since it additionally
provides primary benefits.
6Yet, in the case where joint products are strong complements, different and quite surprising demand
responses can be observed, see Cornes and Sandler (1994).
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They analyze a consumer’s decision between two different commodities. One commodity
is a private good whose purchase is associated with and tied to the finance of a public
output (joint production). The other commodity is a purely private good. Therefore,
they consider two different technologies providing private good consumption, one which
is associated with joint production and one without joint production. This idea is now
revived in Section 2, where we present a more general setting of the comparative statics
model suggested by Cornes and Sandler (1994).7 The integration into the compara-
tive statics model, however, requires the analysis of three instead of two commodities.
By this extension different levels of substitutability between the jointly provided private
goods/characteristics and other private goods can be captured, i.e. heterogeneity among
private goods/characteristics is taken into account. Only a certain group of private goods
is considered to represent an adequate substitute for the joint production’s private char-
acteristic, and this group is assumed to be regulated by a central authority. As we will
show, these extensions are sensible for analyzing several real-world impure-public-goods
examples. The focus of the comparative statics analysis in Section 3 will be on the two
parameters directly associated with the substitute: its prices and quantities.
Afterwards, in Section 4, our paper goes beyond the analytical analysis of comparative
statics by replicating the analytical approach into the sphere of numerical simulation. We
employ the impure-public-good example of climate policy in Germany in order to simulate
the comparative statics in the framework of a parameterized simulation model.
Section 5 stresses the main findings of the simulation model and compares them to
the analytical findings. Results which could be found in the simulations but not in the
analytical model are highlighted. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Impure Public Good Model
In the subsequent sections, an agent’s decision on public good provision is analyzed in an
impure public good model, where the comparative static properties are investigated with
respect to modifications in the impure-public-good independent production technology
of the private characteristic which is also generated by the public good. The agent’s
responses are expressed in terms of parameters associated with standard price taking
functions.
7This modification has first been suggested by Ru¨bbelke (2002, 2003).
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2.1 Characteristics of Impure Public Goods
Similar to Posnett and Sandler (1986), we consider an impure public good whose private
characteristic can also be generated independently of the public characteristic. We analyze
the impact of the independent generation of the joint production’s private characteristic on
agents’ willingness to provide the impure public good. Hence, the level of the independent
generation as well as its price have to be considered. In order to analyze the impact of the
independent generation of the private characteristic on agents’ willingness to provide the
public good, we have to formulate an agent’s utility maximization problem in a way that
takes explicit account of the characteristics of the joint production. Agents’ preferences
are not expressed in commodity space but in characteristic space, i.e. not the amount of
commodities acquired but the amount of characteristics enjoyed are crucial for the agents’
maximization problems.8 We distinguish the characteristics provided by the impure public
good according to their degree of publicness:
Pure public characteristic: No agent of the considered ‘model world’ can be excluded from
its consumption and it exhibits non-rivalry.
Private characteristic: The private characteristic of an impure public good provision can
be exclusively enjoyed by the agent making this provision. The public good contributing
agent may be an individual, a region or a country.
2.2 Utility Function and Characteristics
We consider an agent whose preferences with respect to the consumption of three char-
acteristics - y1, y2 and X - are represented by a continuous utility function, U(y1, y2, X),
that is strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave and everywhere twice differentiable.
The country consumes three commodities:
First private good : Each unit of the first generates one unit of y1 for the country at
a price py = 1. The commodity represents a bundle of private goods to the country and it
may be thought of to be identical to the characteristic y1. The symbol y1 can consequently
be used to denote either the first characteristic or the good that generates it. y1 is used
as the numeraire good in all that follows.
Second private good : The second commodity s generates the private characteristic y2.
8For a distinction of characteristics and commodities see Cornes (1992: 139).
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The generated characteristic y2 is identical to the one which arises from the impure public
good. One unit of s is assumed to have the price ps and to generate one unit of charac-
teristic y2. Therefore, s does not only denote the consumption of the second commodity,
it also stands for the amount of characteristic y2 generated by this commodity.
Impure public good : The third good q represents the impure public good and has a
price pq. Each unit generates β units of the public characteristic X. Furthermore, the
impure public good additionally produces α units of the private characteristic y2.
The total consumption of the public characteristic X by agent i equals the sum of his
own contribution xi = βqi and the other n − 1 agents’ contributions X˜i = βQ˜i:
X = x1 + x2 + ... + xn =
n∑
j=1
xj = xi + X˜i = β
n∑
j=1
qj = β(qi + Q˜i). (1)
2.3 Constraints Limiting the Welfare Maximization
There are three constraints limiting the feasible consumption set from which the agent
chooses his most preferred point:
• The first constraint is represented by the conventional budget constraint:
y1 + pss + pqq = I, (2)
with pq > ps. Hence, the agent spends his whole income on the consumption of the
three commodities.
• The Nash-Cournot assumption is made that an individual agent takes the other
agents’ generation of the public characteristic
X˜ = X − βq (3)
as exogenously given. Furthermore, the parameter β is considered to be the same
across all agents, which is equivalent to assuming that Q˜ is taken as given.
• We assume that an agent has to provide an exogenously fixed quantity of s units of
characteristic y2 directly. It is assumed that this obligation is laid down by a national
or international regulation. The unit cost of s is also assumed to be exogenously
determined. Therefore,
s = s¯ and ps = p¯s. (4)
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In the formulation of the agent’s consumption problem, (4) is substituted into (2) and
(3). Furthermore, the technological condition q = y2−s
α
, can be employed to remove q
from the constraints and to express agent i’s maximization problem as
max
y1,y2,xi
U(y1, y2, X) (5)
subject to
y1 + p¯ss¯ + pq(
y2−s¯
α
) = I and −β(y2 − s¯) + αX = αX˜.
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Figure 1: Constraints and Welfare Maximum.
Figure 1 illustrates the constraints restricting the agent’s utility maximization: the
constraint on the left-hand side is depicted by the plane ABCD and the constraint on the
right-hand side is represented by plane T’U’V’. The distance between U and the origin
of the three axis measures the total level of the pure public characteristic generated by
the other agents, X˜. Starting from the point U the agent has to buy s¯ units of the
second characteristic directly (constraint 3). Thus, we move to point U’; starting from
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this point the agent may buy units of the impure public good q or the private good
y1. The consumption of impure public good q and private good y1 is limited by the
aforementioned constraint depicted by plane ABCD. Therefore, the set of points that
satisfy all three constraints lies on the line which links point F to the point G. One of
the indifference curves from the set of indifference curves representing the agent’s convex
preferences over the three characteristics is tangent to the line FG.9 The tangential point
represents the allocation providing the highest attainable utility level. In Figure 1 the
point E represents this point. Strict convexity of preferences guarantees that there is a
unique point of tangency E .
2.4 Virtual Magnitudes
Let us next formulate the restrictions limiting an agent’s consumption by using param-
eters associated with familiar price-taking behaviour. Therefore, we have to introduce
virtual magnitudes. These magnitudes (virtual prices and income) have to guarantee
that a consumer chooses to take precisely the same amount of each commodity as he
consumes on the efficient point E . Since the externalities of the public characteristic have
to be considered, not the monetary income is of main importance but the virtual income.
The virtual income may also be denoted ‘hypothetical income’, ‘full income’ or ‘social
income’. Becker (1974: 1063) defines ‘social income’ as “the sum of person’s own income
(his earnings, etc.) and the monetary value to him of the relevant characteristics of oth-
ers”. We denote the three hypothetical or virtual prices of the characteristics and the
hypothetical income that would lead a price-taking agent to choose the characteristics
bundle in E by ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, and µ respectively.
If it is warranted that the virtual budget constraint containing the virtual magnitudes,
µ = ψ1y1 + ψ2y2 + ψ3X, induces a price-taking agent to choose the allocation E , the
virtual magnitudes could be employed in order to form the virtual budget plane PQR
that allows for abandonment of the other restricting planes in Figure 1. The points E ,
F and G have to be located in the plane PQR. Thus, the virtual magnitudes depend on
the location of the tangential point E between FG and the indifference surfaces, and the
point E itself depends on the observed parameters of the choice problem ps, pq, I, X˜, s,
α, β. Consequently, it is required that:
ψi = fi(y1, y2, X) = ψi(ps, pq, I, X˜, s, α, β),
9The set of indifference curves are not depicted in Figure 1.
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µ = fµ(y1, y2, X) = µ(ps, pq, I, X˜, s, α, β).
The functions ψi reflect the slopes in the relevant directions of the indifference surface at
the allocation E . Since only the relative magnitudes are relevant, the virtual price of the
first characteristic can be set equal to unity. The virtual income function µ determines
the income that puts the budget plane on the level where it has the tangency point with
the indifference surfaces in E . Consequently, the plane PQR would support consumption
of a price-taking agent at allocation the agent’s efficient allocation E .
2.5 Linkage Between Exogenous and Virtual Parameters
The linkage of the virtual magnitudes to the exogenous parameters has to meet the
following requirements:
• The unit price the agent is willing to pay for the impure public good is equal to the
price pq that is actually paid. This price has to coincide with the valuation of the
characteristics generated by the unit of the impure public good. The virtual prices
reflect these valuations. Per unit of the impure public good α units of y2 and β units
of X are provided such that:
pq = αψ2(Θ) + βψ3(Θ). (6)
Here, βψ3(Θ) represents the benefits derived from the public and αψ2(Θ) the ben-
efits derived from the private characteristics of a unit of the impure public good.
Furthermore, the vector Θ gathers the observed parameters p¯s, pq, I, X˜, s¯, α, β.
• In addition to the provision of y2 by s, the provision of the impure public good
generates y2. The amount by which characteristic 2 is augmented by the agent’s
provision of the impure public good has to be proportional to the amount by which
the agent augments the other agents’ provision of the public characteristic:
β{D2(ψ2(Θ), ψ3(Θ), µ(Θ))− s} = α{D3(ψ2(Θ), ψ3(Θ), µ(Θ))− X˜}. (7)
Dk, with k = 2, 3, stands for the uncompensated demand functions with respect to
characteristics 2 and 3 respectively.
• The virtual income of agent i must be consistent with the value of the chosen allo-
cation at E :
µ(·) = y1 + ψ2(·)y2 + ψ3(·)X
= y1 + ψ2(·)y2 + ψ3(·)(x + X˜) (8)
9
Using equations (6), (7), (8) as well as the facts that I = y1 + pq
y2−s
α
+ pss and
y2 = αq + s, virtual income can be expressed:
µ(·) = y1 + pss + pqq + ψ3X˜ + (ψ2 − ps)s = I + ψ3X˜ + (ψ2 − ps)s. (9)
The expression for µ(·) in (9) deviates from the commonly employed expression of virtual
income by the term (ψ2 − ps)s. This is due to the fact that in the considered case the
production of s is allowed to be suboptimal low and the virtual price ψ2 may not be equal
to the price ps. If no inefficient low level of s prevails, the prices ps and ψ2 coincide and
the term (ψ2 − ps)s vanishes.
3 Comparative Statics
An agent can modify the extent of impure-public-good independent generation of the
second private characteristic. The raised efforts in such independent generation affect
the attractiveness of impure-public-good provision. The same holds with respect to price
variations of the impure-public-good independent generation of the second private char-
acteristic. The impacts of these effort and price variations are analyzed in the subsequent
sections.
3.1 Variation of the Independent Generation of the Second Char-
acteristic
In order to determine the impact of an increased impure-public-good independent genera-
tion of the second characteristic on the impure-public-good provision level, we have – in a
first step – to differentiate equations (6), (7) and (9) with respect to s. This differentiation
yields
0 = αψ2s + βψ3s,
β(D22ψ2s + D23ψ3s + D2µµs)− β = α(D32ψ2s + D33ψ3s + D3µµs),
µs = X˜ψ3s + sψ2s + ψ2 − ps.
where Dk2 =
∂Dk
∂ψ2
, Dk3 =
∂Dk
∂ψ3
, Dkµ =
∂Dk
∂µ
, ψ2s =
∂ψ2
∂s
, ψ3s =
∂ψ3
∂s
and µs =
∂µ
∂s
.
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This system can be written:


α β 0
βD22 − αD32 βD23 − αD33 βD2µ − αD3µ
−s −X˜ 1




ψ2s
ψ3s
µs


=


0
β
ψ2 − ps


.
Second, we employ Cramer´s rule and set α = β = 1 for simplicity reasons. This
yields the following price and income responses:
ψ2s =
(D2µ − D3µ)(ψ2 − ps)− 1
Ω
,
ψ3s =
1− (D2µ − D3µ)(ψ2 − ps)
Ω
,
µs = X˜
1− (D2µ − D3µ)(ψ2 − ps)
Ω
+ s
(D2µ − D3µ)(ψ2 − ps)− 1
Ω
+ ψ2 − ps,
where Ω = ∂C2
∂ψ3
− ∂C2
∂ψ2
− ∂C3
∂ψ3
+ ∂C3
∂ψ2
> 0. Here, C stands for compensated demand functions.
As already mentioned above, virtual prices and income can be expressed as functions
of the exogenous parameters ps, pq, s, X˜, I, α, β. By definition virtual magnitudes have to
ensure that the succeeding condition holds with respect to the uncompensated demand
of the agent:
D∗k(Θ) = Dk(ψ2(Θ), ψ3(Θ), µ(Θ)), k = 1, 2, 3. (10)
Now, in a third step, the differentiation of (10) with respect to s, substitution of the
calculated price and income responses and application of the Slutzky decomposition yields
the following responses (for an extensive discussion of the calculations see Ru¨bbelke (2002,
2003)):
D2s =
C23 − C22
Ω
+ D2I(ψ2 − ps), (11)
D3s = D2s − 1 = C33 − C32
Ω
+ D3I(ψ2 − ps). (12)
Provided that the characteristics 2 and 3 do not represent very strong complements and
as long as the virtual price ψ2 of characteristic 2 exceeds the price ps for direct provision of
this characteristic, the response of the demand D2 to an increase in s is positive. This is on
the one hand due to the fact that – provided both characteristics behave like normal goods
11
– an income rise will increase the demand for both characteristics and hence, the second
terms on the right-hand sides of both responses are positive (see Ru¨bbelke (2002, 2003)).
On the other hand this is due to the exclusion of the case of very strong complements,
and therefore C23 > C22.
10 The latter causes the first term of (11) also to be positive.
The sign of the response of D3 is ambiguous since the difference between C33 and C23
is negative. Hence, it is ambiguous whether the provision of the impure public good will
rise or decrease.
Yet, if it is assumed that ps equals ψ2, then the response D2s is definitely positive
and the response in D3s is definitely negative. Then, the overall response of the provision
of the impure public good is negative since direct provision of the second characteristic
crowds out indirect provision via impure public good provision.
3.2 Variation of the Price of the Technology Which Generates
the Second Characteristic Independently
Let us next analyze the impact of a change in the price of the impure-public-good inde-
pendent generation of the second private characteristic. By differentiation of equations
(6), (7) and (9) with respect to ps, we get
0 = αψ2ps + βψ3ps ,
β(D22ψ2ps + D23ψ3ps + D2µµps) = α(D32ψ2ps + D33ψ3ps + D3µµps),
µps = ψ3psX˜ + (ψ2ps − 1)s.
This can be expressed:


α β 0
βD22 − αD32 βD23 − αD33 βD2µ − αD3µ
−s −X˜ 1




ψ2ps
ψ3ps
µps


=


0
0
−s


.
By application of Cramer´s rule and setting α = β = 1, we get the following price and
income responses:
ψ2ps =
−s(D2µ − D3µ)
Ω
,
10Consider, that compensated cross-price responses are symmetric; see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980:
43-45) as well as Cornes (1992: 71-72).
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ψ3ps =
s(D2µ − D3µ)
Ω
,
µps = X˜
s(D2µ − D3µ)
Ω
+ s
−s(D2µ − D3µ)
Ω
− s.
By differentiating (10) with respect to ps, applying the Slutzky decomposition and sub-
stituting the calculated price and income responses, we get:
D2ps = D3ps = s
(C22 − C23)D3µ + (C33 − C32)D2µ
Ω
= −(sD2I). (13)
Thus, a rise in the price for direct acquisition of characteristic 2 induces only an income
effect. This is in line with Neary and Roberts (1980: 34) who point out that an increase
in the price of a rationed good simply forces the consuming household to pay more for the
rationed consumption level. Because the uncompensated demand for characteristics 2 and
3 decrease, the agent will lower his impure-public-good provision level. However, the latter
result is a consequence of the model assumption that the independent generation of joint
products cannot be substituted by a generation which is associated with the impure public
good production. Otherwise, the higher opportunity cost of the independent generation
may cause the impure-public-good provision level to rise.
4 Numerical Simulation
Since our analytical solutions are not clear-cut, we employ the impure-public-good exam-
ple of climate policy in Germany to numerically simulate the effects of alternative tech-
nologies in a parameterized model. The simulation model reveals directions of impacts
where the analytical model has ambiguous results and gives insights into the magnitude
of effects associated with changes in the quantity and the price of the impure-public-good
independent generation of the second private characteristic.
4.1 Impure Public Goods: The Example of Climate Policy
Since climate policy, e.g., in the shape of a CO2 tax, provides pure public as well as
private characteristics, it can be regarded as an impure public good. Pure public and
private characteristics are provided by climate policy (see Figure 2).
The pure public characteristic subsumes the effects generated by climate policy that
can be enjoyed globally, irrespective of which country abates. The pure public character-
istic provided by climate policy is climate protection. No country can be excluded from
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its consumption and it exhibits non-rivalry. Benefits resulting from climate protection are
the primary benefits of climate policy.
Climate policy also provides some private characteristic with purely local/regional
influence that can be exclusively enjoyed by countries/regions generating climate policy.
The benefits, which countries enjoy from consuming the private characteristic are the
ancillary or secondary benefits.
Economic-Policy   
(e.g. CO2-Tax) 
GHG Abatement Measures
Pure Public Characteristic: 
reduction of CO2 emissions
Private Characteristic:      
e.g., reduction of SO2 emissions  
 Primary Benefits               Ancillary Benefits 
Figure 2: Primary and Ancillary/Secondary Benefits.
Yet, we have to take account of the fact that the ancillary benefits can also be gener-
ated independently of climate policy. Desulphurization installations, for example, reduce
the emission of SO2 independently of climate policy. So, the higher the level of such instal-
lations, the lower will be the (marginal) ancillary benefits of climate policy. Subsequently,
we will focus on the ancillary effect of SO2 emission mitigation.
4.2 The Simulation Model
This section describes the data used to parameterize the analytical model presented in
Section 2 in order to simulate numerically the effects of changes in the quantity and
prices of the alternative technology which are analyzed analytically in Section 3. For the
calibration we consider the example of climate policy in Germany in the year 2010 where
CO2 emission reductions is the impure public good and SO2 emission reduction is the
14
private environmental good.
To parameterize the benchmark demand for the impure public good and the private
environmental good we assume that international obligations are revealed preferences for
the national provision of the two goods, CO2 and SO2 emission reductions. The Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
which entered into force in February 2005 imposes greenhouse gas emission limits for
industrialized countries (UNFCCC (1997)). In May 2002, the European Union (EU)
ratified the Kyoto Protocol committing itself to a reduction of EU-wide greenhouse gas
emissions by 8% vis-a`-vis 1990 emission levels during 2008-2012. The aggregate EU
reduction requirement has been redistributed among individual Member States according
to an EU-internal Burden Sharing Agreement resulting in a reduction requirement for
Germany of 21% (CEC (1999a)). Given CO2 emissions of 952 MtCO2 in Germany and
3,068 MtCO2 in the EU in 1990, the emission targets associated with the Kyoto Protocol
amount to 752 MtCO2 for Germany and 2,823 MtCO2 for the EU. Projected emissions
for 2010 (the base-year for our model simulations) amount to 839 MtCO2 for Germany
and 3,311 MtCO2 for the EU (CEC (2001a)). This yields a benchmark demand for
CO2 emission reduction for Germany of q = 87 MtCO2. We assume that real emission
reductions are only achieved in Europe and that the Kyoto Protocol is in addition reduced
to symbolic policy (Lo¨schel and Zhang (2003)). The other agents’ provision of the impure
public good is then Q˜ = 401 MtCO2. In 1990, SO2 emissions were 5280 ktSO2. They are
projected to decrease to 740 ktSO2 until 2010 (CEC (2001a)). Given the German SO2
emission target of 520 ktSO2 in 2010 stated in the EU directive on National Emission
Ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants (CEC (2001b)), the demand for the private
environmental good SO2 emission reduction is y2 = 220 ktSO2.
The parameter α that describes the extent of SO2 emission reduction that is generated
through the reduction of CO2 emissions is estimated through simulation experiments
with the GEM-E3 model for Europe (Capros et al. (1997)). It is a full scale general
equilibrium model for 15 European countries, linked through endogenous bilateral trade.
The environmental module of GEM-E3 concentrates on three environmental problems: (i)
global warming, (ii) problems related to the deposition of acidification emissions and (iii)
ambient air quality linked to acidifying emissions and tropospheric ozone concentration.
Hence, it considers energy-related emissions of primary pollutants CO2, NOX , SO2, VOC
and particulates. There are two mechanisms of emission reduction explicitly specified in
the model: substitution between fuels and between energetic and non-energetic inputs
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and emission reduction due to a decline in production and consumption. We simulate
with the GEM-E3 model a scenario where Germany reaches its burden sharing emission
level of CO2 through a domestic permit system. In this scenario the marginal cost of
CO2 abatement (price of the impure public good) is pq = 29.0 Euro97/tCO2 and α =
1.30 ktSO2/MtCO2. The amount of SO2 emission reduction that is generated through
reduction of CO2 to reach the German Kyoto obligations is 113 ktSO2. The benchmark
quantity of SO2 emission reduction that has to be provided independent of climate policy
to reach the EU National Emission Ceilings is therefore s = 107 ktSO2.
The marginal costs of SO2 reductions by different control technologies for Germany
in the current legislation (baseline) scenario for 2010 is taken from the Regional Air
Pollution Information and Simulation (RAINS) model (Cofala and Syri (1998)), which
is applied as a scenario analysis tool in the context of the international negotiations
under the UN/ECE Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and for the
development of the acidification and ozone strategies of the European Union (Alcamo
et al. (1990)). RAINS concentrates on the technical emission control options, which
do not imply structural changes of the energy system. Five broad groups of technical
emission control options are distinguished: (i) the use of low-sulphur fuels, including fuel
desulphurization, (ii) in-furnace control of SO2 emissions, (iii) conventional wet flue gas
desulphurization processes, (iv) advanced, high efficiency methods for capturing sulphur
from the flue gas, and (v) measures to control process emissions. The marginal cost for
107 ktSO2 reduction or equivalently the benchmark price of the alternative technology
amounts to ps = 4, 920 Euro97/tSO2.
The total budget is taken from the macroeconomic assumption for Germany in the
baseline scenario “European Environmental Priorities” (Capros et al. (2000), CEC (1999b)):
I = 2, 561, 000 million Euro97.
We employ a linear logarithmic utility function of the form
U = γ1 ln y1 + γ2 ln y2 + γ3 ln X (14)
and calibrate the parameter in the utility function such that our benchmark data set
is replicated. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameter values for the numerical
simulations. In the simulation runs we then vary the benchmark values of the quantity s
and the price ps of the alternative technology.
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y1 (in M Euro97) 2,557.95 X (MtCO2) 488 
py (Euro97) 1 I (in 000 M Euro97) 2,561 
s (ktSO2) 107 α (ktSO2/ MtCO2) 1.30 
ps (Euro97/t CO2) 4,920 β 1 
q  (MtCO2) 87 U 29.52 
pq (Euro97/t CO2) 29 Ψ1 1 
  Q%   (MtCO2) 401 Ψ2 1,6730.77 
  X
~
  (MtCO2) 401 Ψ3 7.25 
x  (MtCO2) 87 µ 2,565.17 
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values.
5 Simulation Results and the Impure Public Good
Model
The simulation yielded some interesting results which either confirm our analytical in-
vestigation or reveal the direction of impacts given ambiguous results in the analytical
model. Furthermore, our findings turn out to have surprising implications. In contrast to
the analytical model, the simulation study allows us to have an explicit look on changes
in utility levels induced by changes of individual parameters.
The effects induced by a change in the price of the second private good are in line
with the predictions of the impure public good model (see Figure 3). A rising price causes
the consumption of all goods y1, y2, q (as well as welfare) to decline, which is due to the
negative income effect exerted by the increase in the price of the rationed good. The
income effect is the only effect resulting from the increase in ps, as Neary and Roberts
(1980) as well as our analytical analysis show. Therefore, the simulation result is not very
surprising but confirms the appropriateness of our analytical approach. We can observe
from Figure 3, how virtual income and utility level decline with rising price levels of the
rationed good.
In contrast to the unambiguous impacts of the increase in ps predicted by the analytical
impure public good model, the model’s forecasts of effects of a change in the level s of
the consumption of the second private good on the impure public good provision were
ambiguous. The analytical model predicted that the increase in s may raise or reduce the
provision level q of the impure public good. In our simulation model, we find a negative
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Figure 3: Effects induced by a change in the price of the second private good ps (per-
centage change vs. benchmark value).
effect of the increase in the second private good consumption level on impure public good
provision q. This decline in impure public good provision is accompanied by a rise in
welfare and virtual income levels. Yet, utility levels increase at a declining pace with
rising levels of s.
A very interesting and surprising result is that variations in the price ps of the rationed
second private good do only have minor negative impacts on climate protection levels q
compared to variations in the levels of the rationed good s (see Figures 3 and 4). With
respect to our example of climate policy, this means that an increase in the prices of tech-
nologies independently (of climate policy) generating private ancillary effects of climate
policy (like desuphurisation installations reducing SO2 emissions) does not have a very
strong negative impact on climate protection levels. In contrast, regulations prescribing
higher standards for pollution control of local or regional air pollutants tend to have a
significant negative impact on climate protection levels. Nevertheless, these regulations
tend to improve welfare, although the welfare improvement rises at a slower pace with
increasing emission control. The welfare improvement is due to the suboptimal low pro-
vision of SO2 emission control in the baseline scenario: with increasing control levels, the
marginal benefits of SO2 emission control decline.
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6 Conclusions
There exists a great variety of application options for impure public good models. In
fact, almost every public goods has an impure public character especially when we regard
international public goods.
The analytical model we presented in Section 2 addresses such impure public goods.
Yet, in many cases, the private characteristic of the impure public good can be produced
by different means. Therefore, in contrast to standard public good models, we intro-
duced a third technology, generating the private characteristic of the impure public good
independently. We supposed this technology to be rationed and it was in the center of
the focus of our analysis. We derived by means of our analytical model the impact this
technology’s application and price have on the provision level of the impure public good.
Therefore, we investigated influences which are omitted in standard pure public good
models, which do not take account of private characteristics associated with public good
provision.
In order to check and refine the results of the analytical study, we employed a sim-
ulation model for the example of climate policy in Germany. Here, climate protection
represents the global public characteristic of the impure public good ‘climate policy’,
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while SO2 abatement represents the private characteristic, from an individual country’s
point of view. In fact, most options to reduce the emission levels of the greenhouse gas
CO2 turn out to be simultaneously reducing the emissions of SO2. However, the emissions
of SO2 can also be mitigated independently of climate policy by means of desulphurisa-
tion installations, which represent the technology independently generating the private
characteristic of the impure public good.
We had to take account of the fact that the degrees of publicness vary with diver-
gent entities considered. So, in standard analyses local/regional air pollution reductions
represent a public good for inhabitants of the respective local/regional area. Yet, on the
international scale we considered, abatement of local/regional air pollution turns out to
become a private good from an individual country’s point of view (while still representing
a public good for individual inhabitants living in the area enjoying higher air quality).
The results of the simulations confirmed the findings of the analytical model. So,
the increase of the price of climate-policy independent SO2 abatement exerts a negative
income effect. Consequently, the abatement has a negative impact on impure public good
provision, and therefore on climate protection levels. As our explicit illustration of welfare
effects in the framework of the simulation model shows, welfare levels unambiguously
decline with the considered price increases.
In contrast to the ambiguous results of our analytical representation with respect to
the impacts of an increase in the provision of the rationed good, we found unambiguous
effects of such an increase in our simulation model. The provision of the impure public
good decrease with increasing levels of the rationed private good. Due to the inefficiently
low provision level in the baseline scenario, the increased production of the rationed good
caused an improvement of welfare.
Interestingly, the impact of the price increase of SO2 abatement has minor effects on
climate protection levels compared to increases in the climate-policy-independent enhance-
ment of SO2 abatement. Consequently, it turns out to be likely that stricter regulations
on air-pollution may cause the attractiveness of climate policy to decline significantly,
while price increases of this control tend to have only minor effects.
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